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Norwegian General Hospitals, 1970–2002: County
Ownership—An Interlude between Welfare
Localism and State Direction
TORE GRØNLIE*
Over the last three decades, Norway has experienced two fundamental reforms in
hospital organization and direction. In 1970 the nineteen county authorities took over
ownership and budget responsibilities for hospitals within their areas, replacing a highly
varied and complex structure of ownership, typically generated locally. In 2002 hospitals
were transferred to the state and amalgamated into five regional government enterprises.
These, in turn, have organized all hospitals in their region under local health enterprises.
Both regional and local enterprises are separate legal entities, with their own executive
boards and managing directors. The Minister of Health appoints the boards of the regional
enterprises, while their directors and the boards of the local enterprises are appointed
by the regional boards. Both regional and local enterprises are supposed to have full
autonomyforday-to-dayoperations,whilebeingsubjecttostrategicandpoliticaldecisions
by the Minister of Health as the ultimate authority of the enterprise assembly
(foretaksmøte).
1 The ‘‘enterprise’’ concept is, of course, borrowed from private business,
modelled on companies of limited liability. The choice of this organizational model must
be understood at least partly within the context of a general politico-administrative reform,
inspired by the worldwide New Public Management movement. Each enterprise is a
separate economic entity with a clear responsibility for balancing its budgets. Privatization
(or part-privatization) and bankruptcy, however, are out of the question, as the state in the
end retains full economic responsibility.
The objective of this article is to contribute towards an understanding of this pattern of
reform. I will suggest three explanations. First, ownership and organization in the hospital
sector falls nicely into a long line of development in the creation of the Norwegian welfare
state—with the emphasis on ‘‘state’’. This can be described as the development from
‘‘welfare localism’’ to central direction with the aim of equalizing welfare provisions
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This article should be considered more of a framework
forresearchatanearlystageinaresearchprojectonthe
Norwegian hospital organization and direction since
1970, than a report on the results of research. I am
greatly indebted to several historians and political
scientists who have earlier contributed to the field, as
noteswillshow.Iamalsogratefulformostconstructive
comments by the referees.
Whatareconsideredherearegeneralsomatichospitals,
not psychiatric institutionalized care or specialized
institutions. In general, the state, at an early time, took
greater responsibility for the building and running of
psychiatricandspecializedinstitutions,thanforgeneral
somatic hospitals.
1Drawing the dividing line between what are
strategic or political questions on the one hand and
day-to-dayoperationsontheother,isacentralandmost
difficult task in this form of public enterprise, as in all
others.Inthecourseofthefouryearsofimplementation
of the reform the problem has already caused several
conflicts and heavy media exposure. In the wider
setting of general Norwegian public administration
189nationally. The desire to secure equal rights, care and benefits nationwide has always been
a concern of the state, but I will argue that this concern has greatly increased over the last
few decades. From this perspective, the two reforms in 1970 and 2002 could even be
considered as two steps in one and the same process. This theme of centralization versus
decentralization is, of course, a general and common one in international hospital history,
2
and in the on-going reform debate on hospital organization in several countries in the
western world. It is also an important theme in ongoing social science research on current
hospital reform. A central question in this respect, which calls for a broader comparative
approach than is possible within the scope of this article, is whether developments in
Norway—from a decentralized towardsa centralizedsystem ofhospitalorganization—run
counter to a general trend towards decentralization of hospital management and direction,
and if this is the case, why?
3
Secondly, both the reorganization of the 1970s and that of 2002 fall neatly into a broader
pictureof fundamental Norwegian politicaland administrativegovernmentreform.Impor-
tant factors behind both hospital reforms are thus at least as much connected to the
problems of reorganization of government and administration in general, as they are
specific to hospital politics. Thirdly, the fundamental problems and tensions that inspired
reform at the beginning of the new millennium were basically the same as those that made
reform necessary thirty years earlier. Several problems in hospital politics were probably
greater at the end of the three decades of county ownership than at the beginning. I will
therefore argue that it is possible to see the phase of general county ownership as an
interlude in a hundred-year-long search for the ‘‘right’’ way of organizing Norwegian
hospitals. Circumstances and what are considered good and appropriate organizational
solutions probably change more than the fundamental problems of hospital politics, which
have turned out to be surprisingly consistent and recalcitrant. State regional enterprise is
just as much the hegemonic politico-administrative ‘‘solution of today’’ as county own-
ership was in the 1960s and 1970s.
Health Care Traditions, Organization and Politics in Norway
The Norwegian health care system has been characterized as belonging to a Nordic
family of decentralized systems heavily dependent on public funding, in contrast to an
policy, this theme is discussed in Tore Grønlie,
‘Drømmen om en konkurransetilpasset stat –Ytre
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sectorreform:theNorwegianhospitalreform’,Paperto
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2For the British case, see John Mohan, Planning,
markets and hospitals, London, New York,
Routledge, 2002.
3The question raised is central to the research
project ‘Autonomy, transparency and management,
three reform programs in health care: a comparative
project’ at Rokkansenterert (Stein Rokkan Centre for
Social Research), University of Bergen, see Haldor
Byrkjeflot, ‘The making of the health care state? An
analysisoftherecenthospitalreforminNorway’(Paper
to the Bergen Workshop on the History of Health and
Medicine, 18–19 March 2004), in Astri Andresen,
ToreGrønlieandSveinAtleSka ˚leva ˚g(eds),Hospitals,
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Tore GrønlieAmerican system with corporate actors involved in both funding and provision of health
care, the post-1948 UK centralized National Health Service model, and the continental
social insurance models.
4 Funding for the running of hospitals is raised almost exclusively
by taxation, although a major part of it is channelled through a system of national health
‘‘insurance’’, introduced on a decentralized basis before the Second World War, made
compulsory, universal and incorporated into a fully integrated state system of health
benefits and pension schemes before the end of the 1960s. Within the dominant public
sphere, the state, traditionally, has filled important functions in funding and in regulatory
regimes. Ownership and the running of hospitals, however, has as a rule been a domain of
the local and county government, more often than not subject to the general local or county
self-governing representative authorities.
There are important similarities between the Norwegian pre-1970 and the UK pre-1948
systems, in so far as both were heavily decentralized and built upon a mixture of private
(voluntary) and public ownership and finance, and local and county authorities were the
central players on the public side. There is, however, one basic difference: while in
the British system, the voluntary sector was much greater than the municipal one, and
the strong municipal hospital efforts in the period between the world wars could be seen
in the light of easing the shortcomings of the voluntary sector,
5 the voluntary sector of
Norway was considerably less important, its position being more that of a supplement to
the dominant public one.
The politico-administrative system of Norway builds upon a three-level structure, the
state, a middle structure consisting of nineteen counties (fylker) of varying size (half of
them having between 150,000 and 250,000 inhabitants), and 435 (before the mid-1960s
744) local authorities (kommuner) of which almost 60 per cent still have less than 5000
inhabitants. Until 1964 county authorities had jurisdiction only over the rural areas of their
county;townsandcitiesstoodoutside.Thecountyauthorities—untilthemid-1970s—were
composed of the mayors of the rural member communities.
patients and medicine, Conference Proceedings,
Rokkansenteret, Report 6, Bergen, Stein Rokkan
Centre for Social Studies, 2004, pp. 55–76; Haldor
Byrkjeflot and Simon Neby, ‘Norge i Norden: Fra
etternøler til pioner i reformering av sykehussektoren’,
in Sta ˚le Opedal and Inger Marie Stigen (eds), Helse–
Norge i støpeskjeen: søkelys pa ˚ sykehusreformen,
Bergen, Fagbokforlaget, 2005, pp. 47–61. For
international comparison, see, for example, Richard
Freeman, The politics of health in Europe, Manchester
University Press, 2000; Richard B Saltman,
‘Convergence versus social embeddedness: debating
the future direction of health care systems’, Eur. J.
Public Health, 1997, 7 (4): 449–53; Richard Freeman
and Michael Moran, ‘Reforming Health Care in
Europe’, in M Ferrera and M Rhodes (eds), Recasting
European welfare states, London, Frank Cass, 2000,
pp. 35–58.
4Freeman, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 5–7; Simo
Kokko, Petr Hava, Vicente Ortun and Kommo Leppo,
‘The role of the state in health care reform’, in Richard
B Saltman, Joseph Figueras and Constantino
Sakellarides (eds), Critical challenges for health care
reforminEurope,Buckingham,OpenUniversityPress,
1998, pp. 289–307. There is no space here to go into
nuances and historical developments and change.
Models like these in general exaggerate differences
between health care systems and downplay historical
change. Freeman himself warns against relying too
much on rigid classifications, as all health systems are
mixtures of different principles of organization and
finance(pp.6–7).Moreover,tensionsandconflictsofa
general nature of the type focused on in this article are
foundinallcountries,whateverthesystems.Modelsare
put forward here mainly as a point of departure for
a more qualified, empirically based analysis of the
development of the Norwegian hospital system.
5John Mohan, ‘Voluntarism, municipalism and
welfare: the geography of hospital utilisation in
Englandin1938’,Trans.Inst.Br.Geogr.,2003,28(1):
56–74;MartinGorsky,JohnMohanandMartinPowell,
‘Britishvoluntaryhospitals,1871–1938:thegeography
of provision and utilisation’, J. Hist. Geog., 1999, 25
(4): 463–82; Mohan, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 21–67.
191
Norwegian General Hospitals, 1970–2002: County OwnershipThe political scene in Norway between 1935 and 1980 was heavily dominated by the
Labour Party (Social Democrat), governing from a majority position in Parliament
between 1945 and 1965. Since 1980 power has constantly shifted between Social Demo-
cratic and Conservative or Conservative-centre coalitions, as a rule, however, now in
minority positions. During most of the post-Second World War period the building
and upkeep of a generous and universal welfare state and an ambitious national equal-
izationpolicyhasbeenawidelysharedgoalamongmostNorwegianpoliticalparties.Since
the late 1970s, however, under the combined pressures of greater economic austerity and
international movements for the ‘‘modernization’’ and scaling down of the public sector,
political splits have emerged, typically over the issues of limiting the scope and generosity
of some welfare provisions, the introduction of user contributions and the strengthening of
the (highly limited) private components of the health care system. The relative wealth of
the Norwegian state as a result of North Sea oil revenues, however, has contributed greatly
towards making the need for reducing expenditure on public health care less pronounced
than in most countries.
Before the Second World War:
Welfare Localism—Cities and Towns in the Lead
The breakthrough in broad-scale hospital expansion in Norway followed urbanization
towards the end of the nineteenth century.
6 Growth was strongly characterized by what
could be called ‘‘welfare localism’’: hospital building to satisfy locally felt needs for
hospital care. In Norway, the expression ‘‘welfare municipality’’ (velferdskommunen)
is often used as a label for communities that were especially active in the early initiation
of welfare provisions in general, emphasizing the prominent role of local self-governing
authorities.
7 The term ‘‘welfare triangle’’ has been used to denote the important tripartite
partnership between local authorities, private humanitarian organizations, and the state in
the building of the welfare state.
8 I would argue that welfare localism fits our case—
hospitals—better.Itcoversabroadandhighlyvaried spectrumoflocalintereststakingpart
in the expansion of the hospital sector over more than three-quarters of a century. Involved
parties included local and county authorities, humanitarian organizations, private donors,
spontaneouslycreatedhospitalassociationsandevencompanies,whichinsomecaseswere
required to participate by state concessionary statutes.
9 The state contributed substantially:
through investment, by contributions to running expenses (after 1909mainly from national
6See, for example, Rolf Danielsen,
‘Kommunaliseringsprosessen i norske byer
1880–1920’, in Anne-Hilde Nagel (ed.),
Velferdskommunen: kommunenes rolle i utviklingen av
velferdsstaten, Bergen, Alma Mater, 1991, pp. 53–60.
7Tore Grønlie, ‘Velferdskommunen’, in Nagel
(ed.), op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 43–52; Edgar Hovland,
‘Grotidogglanstid.1837–1920’,inHansEyvindN ss,
Edgar Hovland, Tore Grønlie, Harald Baldersheim and
Rolf Danielsen, Folkestyre i by og bygd: norske
kommuner gjennom 150 a ˚r, Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger,
Tromsø, Universitetsforlaget, 1987, pp. 127–43;
Tore Grønlie, ‘Velferdskommune og utjevningsstat,
1945–1970’, in N ss, Hovland, Grønlie, Baldersheim
and Danielsen, ibid., pp. 251–78.
8Anne-Lise Seip, ’Velferdskommuen og
velferdstrekanten – et tilbakeblikk, in Nagel (ed.),
op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 24–42.
9AinaSchiøtz,Folketshelse–landetsstyrke1850–
2003, series: Det offentlige helsevesen i Norge 1603–
2003, vol. 2, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 2003, pp. 320,
322–24; Aage Enges ter and Johs B Thue, Sogn og
Fjordane fylkeskommune gjennom 150 a ˚r, Oslo, Det
Norske Samlaget, 1988, pp. 217–24; Finn Henry
Hansen, ‘Sykehusstruktur i historisk perspektiv’,
in Finn Henry Hansen (ed), Sykehusstruktur
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Tore Grønliehealth ‘‘insurance’’, mandated by law, to which the state from the beginning contributed
20 per cent
10), and through the building of hospitals for special purposes or national
specialized care. Initiatives in hospital expansion, however, were more often than not
local. Quite simply, for several decades, hospital development in Norway as a whole could
best be understood as a nationwide ‘‘chipping in’’ (spleiselag or dugnad). One scholar has
characterized the localization and expansion of hospitals as ‘‘almost anarchic’’.
11 This
development, in its turn, could be considered in the wider context of a ‘‘Norwegian
system’’ of expanding collective services, through activating and bringing together
resources from wherever they could be found.
12 In 1930, 21 per cent of beds in general
hospitals in Norway were in private institutions, 8 per cent were state owned, while 71 per
cent were owned by local authorities (51 per cent), county authorities (11 per cent), or had
joint local and county public ownership (9 per cent).
13
One type of actor, in particular, stands out in the collaborative effort—the cities and
larger towns. The most important role in hospital building and expansion was played by
municipal authorities.
14 It is important to bear in mind the great economic—and cultural—
differences between town and countryside, especially between the cities of some size and
peripheral rural communities. The towns and cities, at least periodically, had a basis of
relative wealth, a surplus to use for welfare expansion for their inhabitants that the rural
communities normally could not muster. And, of course, only the cities and towns had a
population base that was big enough for health institutions of a notable size.
As the figures show, however, county authorities also played a substantial part in
hospital expansion.
15 But it is important to note that the county authorities of the time
normally did not have economic resources that were at all comparable to those of the
bigger cities and towns. At the same time, it can be argued that cities and towns tended
to view hospitals, and social and cultural institutions, not only as an obligation, but also
as status symbols (adelsmerke) or privileges. Hospitals and cultural institutions
i endring: de langer linje og utviklingen siste tia ˚r,
Samdata sykehus report 3/01, Trondheim, SINTEF
Unimed, NIS SAMDATA, 2001, pp. 35–63. The
localized origin of hospitals is underlined also in the
Britishcase,seeMohan,op.cit.,note2above,pp.1–20.
10Hovland, op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 131–2.
11Hansen, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 38: ‘n rmest
‘‘anarkisk’’’.
12Jens Arup Seip, Tanke og handling i norsk
historie, Oslo, Gyldendal, 1968, pp. 22–71.
13NOS IX.2, Sunndhetstilstanden og
medisinalforholdene1930,DetStatistiskeCentralbyra ˚,
Oslo, 1933. The pattern of institutionalization, the
institutional profile of different actors and owners, and
variations over time and across regions has so far not
been subjected to historical analysis in any detail. A
project focusing on these problems is under way at the
Rokkansenteret (Stein Rokkan Centre for Social
Research), University of Bergen. Basic statistics and
listings of institutions by ownership and geography in
both 1960 and 1964 are given in ‘Innstilling om
sykehusordningen’, Innstilling II fra komiteen til
utredning av sykehusordningen
(Sykehusordningskomiteen), 1963, Appendix 2,
parliamentary documents (Norway), Ot.prp. nr. 36
(1967–68),‘Omlovomsykehus’(Onlawonhospitals).
14See, for example, Hansen, op. cit., note 9 above,
pp. 36–8. Accounts of inter-war municipal hospital
expansion in Britain are given in John V Pickstone,
Medicine and industrial society, Manchester
University Press, 1986; Roger Lee, ‘Uneven zenith:
towards a geography of the high period of municipal
medicine in England and Wales’, J. Hist. Geog., 1998,
14 (3): 260–80; Mohan, op. cit., note 5 above,
pp.56–73;andMohan,op.cit.,note2above,pp.21–44.
15See, for example, Schiøtz, op. cit., note 9 above,
pp. 320, 322–7; Enges ter and Thue, op. cit., note 9
above, pp. 217–24; Tor Selstad, Trøndelags romlige
utvikling. Historier og scenarier 1030-2030, Rapport
nr. 2 fra Trøndelagsprosjektet, Trondheim, NTNU,
Geografiskinstitutt,2002;andAstriAndresen,‘Sykehuset
– fra utkanten av helsevesenet til sentrum’, in Marit A
Hauan,EinarNiemi,HelgeAWoldandKetilZachariassen
(eds), Karlsøy og verden utenfor. Kulturhistoriske
perspektiver pa ˚ nordnorske steder, Tromsø Museum,
Universitetsmuseet, 2003, pp. 232–49.
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Norwegian General Hospitals, 1970–2002: County Ownershipconstituted a major contribution towards the making of a town. Towns without these
kinds of institutions were of a lower order and this realization probably spurred them
on to raise their status. At the same time, having a hospital implied an obligation to extend
hospital care to the population of surrounding rural communities and smaller towns. The
larger towns contributed to others ‘‘out of their riches’’ while primarily paying for better
health care for their own inhabitants. For example, until 1952, the city of Bergen alone
covered the investments and deficits of the city hospitals (mainly Haukeland Sykehus),
even though one-fourth to one-third of the patients during the first decade after the war
came from communities outside the city borders.
16 It is not yet known how representative
this was.
The will to engage in building costly welfare institutions was, in general, considerably
less evident at the county level than at that of cities and towns, as were the resources
availableforsuchventures.Thecountyauthoritywasprimarilyaninstitutionofsupportfor
the rural communities of the county. It was, as already stated, composed of the mayors of
the member communities; it depended on taxes levied indirectly on the local communities
and it tended to concentrate on basic and not too costly services for the rural population.
Representatives of member communities generally wanted to keep costs down out of
concern for the tax burden in their home constituencies. Different parts of geographically
diverse counties had conflicting interests as to the location of county hospitals. The bigger
and more well-to-do communities of the county—often densely populated areas bordering
onahospitaltownorcity—hadnogreatinterestinpayingforservicesorcarethatprimarily
catered for the less fortunate of the periphery.
17 An example will illustrate this. The county
of Hordaland, surrounding the city of Bergen, had since the early 1920s owned a building
lot intended to be the site of a county hospital, but this was never built. The county
authorities relied on small private or local authority hospitals in some of the smaller
towns, and on sending patients to Bergen. Only after 1952 did the county pay for the
deficit generated by its own patients.
18
County authorities were generally more active hospital entrepreneurs in counties with-
out towns or cities of some wealth or without relatively easy access to such urban centres.
Thiswas typicallysoinnorthernNorwayandthecountiesofNorthernTrøndelagandSogn
og Fjordane.
19 In some cases, however, even county authority hospitals were located in or
close to the bigger cities or towns.
20 In other counties, intra-county conflicts of interest and
tight county economies contributed towards stimulating localism and the building of
16Tore Grønlie, ‘1945–1972’, in Anders-Bjarne
Fossen and Tore Grønlie, Byen sprenger grensene
1920–1972, vol. 4 of Bergen bys historie, Bergen,
Universitetsforlaget, 1985, pp. 788–98. The running of
hospitals was paid for by national health insurance
(collected through taxation) on the basis of rates
supposed to be sufficient to cover care on a day-to-day
basis. Before the Second World War rates were set
unilaterally by the hospital owner. During and after the
war rates were set by the State Directorate of price
controls, generally at a level considerably below the
actual costs. The hospital owner had to cover the
deficits. In 1980 a system of block grants was
introduced. After 1997 a percentage of block grants
(thirty initially, growing to sixty over the years) were
made dependent on hospital activity.
17The same kind of split between cities and towns
on the one side and counties on the other, was found
in the pre-NHS system in Britain, see Mohan, op. cit.,
note 2 above, pp. 21–67.
18Grønlie, op. cit., note 16 above, pp. 788–98;Karl
EgilJohansen,Pa ˚sjølvstyrgjennom150a ˚r.Hordaland
fylkeskommune 1837–1987, Bergen, J W Eide, 1987,
pp. 164–70.
19Enges ter and Thue, op. cit., note 9 above,
pp. 217–24; Selstad, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 27–8;
Andresen, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 232–49.
20SeeAndresen,op.cit.,note15above,pp.232–49.
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Tore Grønliescattered small hospitals instead of one or a few bigger ones.
21 Thus emerged a structure
combining relatively few big city hospitals and a host of small ones for local care.
The 1940s, 1950s and 1960s:
Towns, Counties or the State—Whose Responsibility?
All of this gradually changed. The economic problems of the 1920s and early 1930s
brought the cost of welfare provision into focus, and hospitals were of prime importance.
The financially less tight late-1930s and early post-war period eased the heaviest strains,
but did not relieve cities and towns of their financial concerns. Aspirations and costs of
hospital care grew. In active welfare municipalities, hospitals increasingly encountered
competition for resources from a host of other welfare schemes and programmes, pensions
initiated and paid for locally, a broad array of social institutions and an ambitious expan-
sion in education. The prestige of being the provider of hospital care was lost in the face of
hard economic realities, and, for the first time, a forward looking state hospital policy was
initiated. All interested parties searched for new solutions. Cities and towns were no longer
interested in accepting ‘‘free riders’’ from surrounding communities and looked for help to
carry increasing costs. Rural districts, represented by the county authorities, were often in
acute need of better health care for their inhabitants, but generally looked for the cheapest
possible alternative. The state sought ways to organize a very necessary expansion, a
general improvement in the quality of hospital care, coordination and specialization on the
regional and national levels, and the lessening of differences in hospital services between
local communities, counties and regions.
22
For some time no clear alternative materialized. In the early 1930s, state medical
authorities had initiated a national plan for hospital development—built on information
from county authorities—as part of a budding national health policy.
23 Shortly after the
war,in1948,county-basedplansforhospitaldevelopmentwereproduced,andthedecision
was taken to establish ‘‘central hospitals’’ (sentralsykehus) as the fundamental unit in a
hierarchy of hospitals, with the county as its population base.
24 A systematic county-based
organization and direction, however, did not materialize for more than twenty years. The
county was still, and remained for a long time, very far from an ideal home for hospitals.
As a well-defined geographical unit, and the only (official) one between the local munici-
palitiesandthecountryatlarge,thecountycouldeasilybeconsideredasthenaturalunitfor
hospitalplanning,andseveralhadsomeorconsiderableexperience ashospitalowners.But
at the same time, as previously indicated, the county was not a unitary political and
administrative entity ready to encompass a system of organization and direction designed
21Enges ter and Thue, op. cit., note 9 above,
pp. 217–24.
22Schiøtz, op. cit., note 9 above, pp. 318–26;
Grønlie, op. cit., note 16 above, pp. 788–98; Johansen,
op. cit., note 18 above, pp. 164–70. There are striking
similaritiesbetweentheorganizationalshortcomingsof
the Norwegian hospital system and the lack of
integrationorcoordinationintheUKsystembeforethe
establishment of the NHS in 1948, and between the
political debates in the two countries, for example,
Charles Webster, The National Health Service: a
political history, Oxford University Press, 2002,
pp. 3–7; Mohan, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 21–67;
Pickstone, op. cit., note 14, pp. 251–95.
23Schiøtz, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 319; Hansen,
op. cit., note 9, pp. 38–41.
24Schiøtz, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 321; Hansen,
op. cit. note 9, pp. 41–4.
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Norwegian General Hospitals, 1970–2002: County Ownershipto govern the complete hospital system of its area. The county was split between institu-
tions for self-government and state functions, and, more importantly, cities and towns—so
dominant in hospital ownership—stood outside the self-governing, service-generating,
institutions of the county.
The county that could become a home for hospital organization and direction in general,
simply did not exist. In the 1940s and 1950s, state efforts to reform local and regional
government and administration were channelled into reorganizing the structure of local
communities, amalgamating towns and rural communities into bigger and economically
more robust units. Well into the 1960s there was also considerable political resistance to
the ideas of reorganizing the county authorities into politico-administrative units capable
of handling important and expanding welfare sectors—such as hospitals and secondary
education.
25
For all these reasons, the collaborative (spleiselag) model for organizing hospital care
was continued, although with the county authorities in an increasingly prominent posi-
tion.
26 There was a clear tendency towards county takeover from local authorities and
private owners that experienced mounting financial difficulties;
27 and there was also a
strong propensity towards organizing cost-sharing partnerships, not only for the expansion
of hospitals or the building of new ones, but for the costs of providing care as well.
28
Different models were tried out: partnerships between all the local authorities (city and
rural) within a county, and co-ownerships or amalgamations between county and city
hospitals.
29 Between 1946 and 1963 the share of hospital beds owned jointly by local
authorities and counties grew from 7 to 27 per cent.
30 Bergen-Hordaland even provides an
example of a tripartite partnership: in 1956 the city-owned hospital was reorganized as a
‘‘hospital partnership’’, in which the city of Bergen, the county of Hordaland, and the state
participated. The main principle of cost sharing was that Bergen and Hordaland would
carry the deficits for patients living within their borders. The state would pay the deficit for
those patients from outside Bergen and Hordaland, and also a part of that for patients
considered to be cases of national concern. Extremely difficult choices and conflicts, with
ensuing negotiations, arose from the fact that one and the same hospital was supposed to
have the different functions of local hospital for Bergen, central hospital for Hordaland,
and regional hospital for all the counties in western Norway. To make matters even more
complicated, after Bergen became the home of the second university of Norway in 1946,
25Y Flo, Mellom stat og sjølvstyre: fylket i norsk
styringsverk etter 1945, LOS-senter Report 0003,
Bergen, LOS-senter, 2000, pp. 24–34.
26Ithasbeensuggestedthatcountiesgraduallytook
on an‘‘unwrittenresponsibility’’ (det uskrevneansvar)
for hospital development, see Kari Martinsen,
‘Helsepolitiske problemer og helsepolitisk tenkning
bak sykehusloven av 1969’, Historisk Tidsskrift, 1987,
3:357–72,p.366.FinnHenryHansensimilarlytalksof
an ‘‘anticipation’’ of a future county model of hospital
ownership, Hansen, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 45.
27Johansen, op. cit. note 18 above, p. 169;
Enges ter and Thue, op. cit., note 9, pp. 296–307.
28Partnerships were used for managing conflicts
of interests between cities, towns and counties in
pre-NHS Britain also, but developed to highly
varying degrees, see Mohan, op. cit., note 2 above,
pp. 45–67, esp. pp. 50–1. See also Pickstone,
op. cit., note 14 above, pp. 272–95; and Martin
Gorsky, ‘‘‘Threshold of a new era’’: the
development of an integrated hospital system in
northeast Scotland, 1900–39’, Soc. Hist. Med.,
2004, 17 (2): 247–67.
29An overview of hospital cooperation and
partnerships is given in ‘Innstilling om
sykehusordningen’, appendix 22, note 13 above.
30Hansen, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 46.
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Tore Grønliethe state, as the owner of the university, was supposed to cover investments in both
buildings and equipment and the running costs of the new faculty of medicine and the
hospital’sfunctionsasauniversityclinic.Theresultwas amoreorlessconstant tug-of-war
between the parties involved that lasted until the county took over ownership in 1972. In
the meantime, however, the state increasingly carried the financial burden. The conflicts
caused a long line of aggravating postponements of the construction of the new regional
hospital and university clinic in Bergen.
31
A uniform organizational model for hospital ownership and direction was, therefore, not
created until 1969, with the passing of the first general hospital law in Norway.
32 The lack
ofarealisticmid-levelalternativetotownorstateownership,is,inallprobability, themain
reason for this. The age of the city- or town-owned hospital was gone. State ownership had
few adherents at the time, but it also seems reasonable to claim that for a long period
hospitals were given lower priority in state welfare policies than some other welfare
programmes, notably the development of state pension schemes, which were considered
bymanythebackboneofthe welfare state.Ingeneral,welfarealsotooksecondplacetothe
strengthening of economic growth: first and foremost post-war reconstruction and indus-
trialization.
33
The 1969 Hospital Law and The ‘‘Hospital County’’
In the 1960s and 1970s, however,Norway witnessed a total transformationof the county
levelofgovernanceand,asaparallelandintegratedprocess,thecreationofthefirstunitary
system of hospital organization throughout the country. This happened through several
simultaneous processes and initiatives for change. First, the reorganization of the county
level of governance could be considered the natural second step in the fundamental
reorganization of local and regional government. The previous one had consisted of
amalgamations and strengthening of the local authorities in the 1950s and first half of
the 1960s. In the course of three decades, the local and countysystems of governmentwere
remoulded to become the prime tool for the national government in developing the welfare
state. Second, the new county authorities were created in response to two other forceful
impulses of the late 1960s and early 1970s: an ideologically based process of democratiza-
tion of considerable strength, paralleled by a strong anti-bureaucratic sentiment. Over little
more than a decade, county governance was completely changed: cities and towns were
includedfrom1964,thencametheseparationofstateandcountyfunctions,electionstothe
county authorities by popular vote, direct county taxation and the creation of an auton-
omous county administration, all completed by 1976. Paralleling the inclusion of towns
and cities in the new county, the state recommended county take-over of hospitals (and
secondary schooling) from 1964. Accordingly, between 1963 and 1970, county ownership
grew from 20 to 63 per cent of hospital beds, while joint ownerships between local
31Grønlie, op. cit., note 16 above, pp. 788–98;
Johansen, op. cit., note 18 above, pp. 164–70; Astrid
Forland, ‘Universitetet i Bergens historie 1946–1996’,
in Astrid Forland and Anders Haaland, Universitetet
i Bergens historie, 2 vols, University of Bergen,
1996, vol. 1, pp. 350–9.
32For a review of the general contents of this law
and the processes leading up to it, see Martinsen,
op. cit., note 26 above, pp. 357–72.
33Trond Nordby, Karl Evang: en biografi, Oslo,
Aschehoug, 1989, pp. 171–92, 215–18, on p. 218;
Martinsen, op. cit., note 26 above, p. 358.
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Norwegian General Hospitals, 1970–2002: County Ownershipauthorities and counties all but disappeared. Beds in private institutions fell to 8 per cent.
34
The 1969 hospital law made county ownership the general rule. Hospitals under private
ownership were allowed to continue in private hands, and granted public funding, but this
depended on their integration into county authority hospital planning and division of
labour.
35 Hospital reorganization fitted extremely well into the politico-administrative
paradigm of the day: county-based organization, a strong belief in democratic processes
and the popular vote, anti-bureaucracy, an almost extreme optimism regarding planning
and coordination under the direction of representative political institutions, and a corres-
pondinglyoptimistic attitude towards an almost unlimited expansion of the welfare state.
36
At the same time county ownership was supposed to counteract localism. The new
county authority and hospital reorganization were created, therefore, through an almost
symbiotic relationship. City and town membership of the county was a necessary pre-
requisite for county hospital organization, and the costly hospital functions in the hands of
the county, in turn, made necessary or natural the subsequent democratic, financial and
administrative reorganization of county authorities.
37 It is also noteworthy that the model
ofthenewcountyauthorityduringthe1960sand1970sdefeatedtwocompetingmodelsfor
administrative reorganization; one built on the expansion of state administrative agencies,
a model that was very strong in the 1950s and 1960s, and another on ideas of regional
(landsdels) planning.
38 It is not yet known whether there were important influences from
abroad. The 1970s were, however, a decade of democratization and decentralization
internationally. Sweden already had a long and well-established tradition of county own-
ership of hospitals, and Denmark, in a process parallel to that of Norway, adopted compar-
able systems.
Transfer to the Counties: Few Problems Solved
The handover of hospitals to the counties did not, in itself, cure many ills, although it did
createareasonablyunifiedsystemofhospitalorganizationoutofahighlycomplexoneand
it eliminated the need for difficult and time consuming decision-making processes and
negotiations between local and county participants on economic responsibilities and
compensation schemes.
39 However, several difficult problems which had been prominent
for decades remained.
The fact that the county had assumed financial responsibility and direction for all
hospitals in its area did not alleviate the tension between localism and coordination at
the county level. The hospital map of Norway was, to a great extent, the result of local
initiatives to meet local welfare needs. A key idea behind the transfer of ownership to the
counties was to enable a high degree of coordination and specialization by subordinating
a hospital structure based on localism to one based on county planning. Of course, the
idea in itself did not remove differences of interest and conflicts between localism and
34Hansen, op. cit., note 9, p. 48.
35Martinsen, op. cit., note 26 above, pp. 367, 371.
36Flo, op. cit., note 25 above, pp. 52–8.
37Ibid., pp. 38–43. Counties were not always
enthusiastic about county ownership of hospitals,
obviously fearing rising costs, see Johansen, op. cit.,
note 18, pp. 218–24.
38Flo, op. cit., note 25 above, pp. 37–57; Grønlie,
‘Velferdskommune og utjevningsstat’, op. cit., note 7
above, pp. 199–281.
39Enges ter and Thue, op. cit., note 9 above,
p. 278; Johansen, op. cit., note 18 above,
pp. 218–24.
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Tore Grønlie‘‘county-ism’’, physically speaking between the central hospitals and the local ones, and
between their communities of location.
The transfer tothe counties did nothing to lessen the tensionbetweena localand county-
based organization and the increasing need to specialize on a regional basis above the
county level.
40 Moreover, assigning responsibility to the counties in no way addressed
problems concerning national priorities and a national division of labour.
While the transfer removed problems concerning cost sharing between local and county
interests, it did not remove tensions between county financial and budgetary responsibil-
ities and the traditionally large contributions from the state (national health ‘‘insurance’’,
investment support, contributions towards costs for out-of-county patients and specialized
needs). The tension was there from the very beginning. It was, however, soon greatly
increased by the fact that the birth of the new hospital organization occurred in the same
decade when the strong economic growth of the post-Second World War period seriously
slowed, and the first concerns arose over the nation’s ability to pay for an increasingly
generous welfare state.
There were also tensions between political priorities and direction on the one hand, and
institutional hospital autonomy on the other. These were present at the county level,
between county political and administrative authorities elected by popular vote on one
side, and hospital administrative and professional leadership on the other. But these
tensions also had a countrywide dimension, with national political priorities opposing
the autonomy of the county. At times there were even conflicts directly between central
political decision-makers and individual hospitals.
Competing strategies for the internal leadership of hospitals led to disagreements
between the medical professions and the professional management (usually based on
economic-administrative expertise), and even between different professions within the
medical camp. Aina Schiøtz presents a concise description of the situation:
Lines of conflict have been drawn between the centre and the periphery, between national
politicians and local ones, between experts and laymen, between different professions and between
professionals locally and centrally. There have been conflicts on localization, on who is going to
pay for what, on the meaning of ‘‘quality’’ and on who is the better qualified to lead and direct—
doctors or non doctors.
41
All these tensions and conflicts had deep roots in Norwegian hospital history.
42 An
important point is that in taking over hospital ownership and management in the early
1970s, the county authorities were never able to start with a clean slate. Their success as
40Regionalization is, of course, a key issue in
hospital politics in most countries, see, for example,
Mohan,op. cit., note2 above,pp. 45–67;and DanielM
Fox, Health policies, health politics: the British
and American experience, 1911–1965, Princeton
University Press, 1986.
41Schiøtz, op. cit., note 9 above, pp. 330–1
(translated by Tore Grønlie): ‘‘Konfliktlinjene har ga ˚tt
mellom sentrum og periferi, mellom sentralpolitikere
og lokalpolitikere, mellom fagekspertise og lekfolk,
mellom profesjoner og mellom fageksperter lokalt og
sentralt. De har dreiet seg om lokaliseringsspørsma ˚l,
omhvemsomskalbetaleforhva,omkvalitetsbegrepets
innhold og om hvem som er best egnet til a ˚ styre
sykehusene—leger eller ikke leger.’’
42The continual conflicts of Norwegian hospital
history are stressed as well by Finn Henry Hansen,
scholar of political science and an experienced top-
level health administrator, Hansen, op. cit., note 9
above, p. 36. In the case of Britain, Mohan shows
how the 1962 Hospital Plan was envisaged to solve
structural problems inherited from the pre-1948
system, but achieved only limited success, Mohan,
op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 132–57.
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Norwegian General Hospitals, 1970–2002: County Ownershiphospital owners came to depend on their ability to solve problems that had accumulated
over decades of uncoordinated hospital growth. There were many legacies of a hundred
yearsoflocalism,othersoflastingconflictsovertheroleandpowerofpolitics,andmedical
expertise and management in the organization and direction of hospitals.
To make matters even more difficult, the democratic enthusiasm that lay behind the
creation of the new county authorities inthe late 1960s and early 1970s soon faded. County
authorities were not, as had been envisaged, empowered with new public functions, and
almost from the beginning suffered from a lack of trust. Instead, new state bureaucracies
were created at the county level. The county authorities headed for a long uphill fight for
legitimacy with politicians and bureaucrats at the national level, and with their own voters
at the county level.
43
County Ownership: The Struggle over Inherited Problems
There is not much historical research on the organizational development of hospitals in
the periodofcountyownership,butonemainimpressionisthatthe countiesexpendedalot
ofenergytryingtosolveinheritedproblems—andthattheydidnotsucceedverywell.This,
in turn, was a major impetus behind the state takeover of 2002. Limitations of space allow
for only a brief outline here.
Counties struggled with localism from the very beginning, and probably in most cases
lost. The history of Norwegian hospitals testifies to the strength of localism. There were no
easyagreementstobefoundonthemeritsofspecializationortheremovaloflocalhospitals
that had been won by local initiative and resources. In several counties, the conflicts over
localization and centralization led to bitter and lasting political—and professional—feuds.
All parties to the conflict argued for the rights of patients; the centralizers lobbied for the
best specialized care, the localists for the security of nearness. In some cases, localism was
reinvigorated, rather than the opposite, by political compromises engineered to strengthen
both specialization and localism at the same time. County authorities were more interested
in an overall expansion of county hospital care, than in the specialization and restructuring
of the system as a whole. At this stage of research it seems reasonable to argue that
‘‘hospital Norway’’ was witnessing a victory of localism over county-ism. Only a handful
of local hospitals were eliminated or amalgamated with bigger units.
44 At the same time,
with rising costs and the technological revolution in hospital medicine, localism, on the
county and national levels, tended to be considered more and more of a problem.
There was also a victory of county-ism over regionalism. A system consisting of a few
regional hospitals (one for each landsdel), above the central hospitals of the counties, had
been decided on shortly after the Second World War. A government White Paper of 1974
divided the country into five health-care regions. A working system of specialization and
division of labour on a regional basis had to be created by cooperating counties. A regional
health board was established to stimulate and coordinate county cooperation on a regional
basis. But, of course, there were no easy solutions. Counties wanted highly specialized
43Flo, op. cit., note 25 above, pp. 68–113.
44Schiøtz, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 324,
374–79; Enges ter and Thue, op. cit., note 9 above,
pp. 217–24; Hansen, op. cit., note 9 above,
p. 54.
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Tore Grønliefunctions within their own territory. As long as cooperation was voluntary, not much was
achieved. The health regions of the time have been labelled ‘‘little more than symbolic
superstructures’’.
45 In 1993 the state made the development of a regional health plan
compulsory, and in 1999 regional cooperation—through the regional health boards—
was made mandatory by law. The new system undoubtedly laid the grounds for a
more authoritative approach towards regionalization. The structure lasted, however,
only a short time before state takeover.
46
Financial problems grew. The promises of a rise in state contributions to the hospitals’
operational costs—to 85 per cent—were never kept. On the contrary, basic state contribu-
tions to hospital budgets decreased considerably—in 1977 down to 50 per cent. Between
1970 and 1980 running costs of Norwegian hospitals grew by a stunning average of 14 per
centayear.Theannualgrowthwasdowntoameagre1to1.5percentduringthe1980sand
first half of the 1990s, then again up to more than 5 per cent in the second half of the
1990s.
47 The haggling between the state and counties over who was supposed to pay for
increasing costs intensified. The funding system was repeatedly changed or modified to
makehospitalsmorecost-efficient,withoutanylesseningofconflicts.
48Conflictsmadefor
the continuing playing of strategic games—to make the other side pay. For counties that
hosted regional hospitals, the fact that the state paid all expenses for the National Hospital
(Rikshospitalet) in Oslo was a constant thorn in their side.
Continuing conflicts over resources intensified the debate over autonomy versus poli-
tical control. Hospitals wanted autonomy from county authorities, while at the same time
building alliances to increase budgets. County authorities wanted autonomy from the state,
while at the same time lobbying for increased state funding. Decisions at lower levels
tended to be appealed to higher levels. On occasion, hospital leaders and local represen-
tatives could not refrain from bypassing the county level. The national assembly
(Stortinget), tended to become the highest court of appeal when regional interests or
popular issues were at stake. Conflicts and conflicting ideologies concerning internal
leadership continued to plague the system, at times more intensely than ever.
49
Given the limited scope of this presentation, I have to leave it at this general level.
50
Hopefully, the main point is clear. Most of the problems facing county authorities as
hospital owners were already there when they took over. And, even though they worked
45Hansen, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 54: ‘‘lite mer
enn symbolske overbygninger’’. Tore Grønlie’s
translation.
46Sta ˚le Opedal and Inger Marie Stigen (eds),
Evaluering av regionalt helsesarbeid: sluttrapport,
NIBR-rapport 2002:22, Oslo, NIBR, 2002; Schiøtz,
op. cit., note 9 above, pp. 328–9.
47O V Sla ˚ttebrekk and H P Aarseth, ‘Aspects
of Norwegian hospital reforms’, Eurohealth, 2003,
9 (2): 14–16.
48Schiøtz,op.cit.,note9above,pp.379–80;Maren
Skaset, ‘Reformtid og markedsgløtt: Det offentlige
helsevesenetter1985’,inSchiøtz,op.cit.,note9above,
pp. 499–548, on pp. 505–7. A system of block grants
from the state was introduced in 1980 after years of
debate. From 1997, 30 per cent of block grants, rising
to 60 per cent in 2003, was made dependent on
hospital activity. There still is no thorough historical
analysis of the development of the system of
hospital financing in Norway.
49Schiøtz,op. cit., note9 above,pp. 382–3;Skaset,
op. cit., note 48 above, pp. 506–7.
50Thepresentarticlefocusesonbasicandpersistent
conflicts and tensions concerning political and
administrative direction and management of hospitals.
Acompleteanalysisofthesuccessesandfailuresofthe
county authorities as hospital owners would have to
include indicators more directly pertinent to patient
care, such as waitinglists, access, questionsof equality
across counties and regions, etc. In Norway, historical
research on this side of county hospital performance is
still in its infancy.
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Norwegian General Hospitals, 1970–2002: County Ownershiphard, these were not solved. That is not to say that the county authorities did a bad job in
hospital direction.They did whatcouldbe expected given the cards they were dealt and the
limits of what was politically possible in the system created around 1970. They probably
even solveda numberof problems. Butthey didnotmanagetosolvethe basic conflicts and
tensions that had been built into the hospital system over a hundred years. Expecting them
to do so was, no doubt, unrealistic.
State Takeover in 2002: Why and How?
‘‘The winter of our discontent’’, is a reasonable way of characterizing the greater part of
thirty years of county hospital history. County authorities had to submit to being the
scapegoat for nearly everything that went wrong in the hospital sector, regardless of
whether the problems originated in county decision-making and/or were within the coun-
ties’ control. Nevertheless, for years virtually everyone continued to search for solutions
within the framework of county ownership. It could also be argued that county authorities
inlater years had somewhat greater successin counteracting localism, and atthe same time
lentgreatersupporttoregionalcooperation,thanduringthefirstdecadesofcountyhospital
rule.
51 Then, shortly after the turn of the century, almost overnight, state takeover won the
day. And the process leading up to the change made it appear the only possible solution a
short time after very few had wanted it. How did this happen?
Thereisstillnotmuchdetailedhistoricalresearchonthefinepoliticalmechanicsofstate
takeover. The solid parliamentary majority that voted in favour of the reform consisted of
thegoverning(inminorityposition)SocialDemocrats,supportedbytheConservativesand
the Progressive (populist right) party. The Radical Left and Centrists (Christian
Democrats), Liberals and the Centre (Agrarians) were opposed. These parties were in
general strongly in favour of local and county self-government. Conservatives and
Progressives, on the other hand, had for some time opposed the continuance of the county
level of governance.
52 Research on the parliamentary stage of the process will have to
focus on the changing position within the governing Labour Party and on the political
leadership that made it possible. One such study emphasizes the strong and determined
leadershipofthenewlyappointedMinisterofHealth,ToreTønne,thePrimeMinister,Jens
Stoltenberg, and other leading figures of the governing Labour Party and a top-down,
heavily centralized, and unusually speedy process of decision made with no extensive
process of deliberation or scrutiny of effects or consequences.
53
The analysis here, however, will be one mainly of structures and trends. The focus
will be on the combined effects of four strong, relatively long-term development trends,
each by itself of prime importance, and one basic ideological shift. All of these worked
51F H Hansen, ‘Sykehusstruktur: fortid–na ˚tid–
framtid?’, in Hansen (ed.), op. cit., note 9 above,
pp. 185–6; Opedal and Stigen, op. cit., note 46 above,
pp. 5–12.
52See parliamentary documents (Norway):
Ot.prp., nr. 60 (2000–2001); Innst. O., nr.
118 (2000–2001); O. tid. (2000–2001),
pp. 666–89, 712–31; L. tid. (2000–2001),
pp. 47–9.
53Sturla Herfindal, ‘Veien frem til
sykehusreformen. En studie av beslutningsprosessen
bak lov om helseforetak’, MA thesis
(hovedfagsoppgave), University of Bergen, 2004,
Rokkansenteret Report 5, Bergen 2004.
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Tore Grønlietogether, making a winning coalition for state takeover not only a possible but a natural
solution.
The first trend is for the country to be divided into new politico-adminstrative units or
regions, which would embrace the counties. The desire for regionalization in hospital
organization, and the processes aimed at achieving a regionalized pattern of specialization
and division of labour have already been noted. Processes spanning thirty years or more
had created a regionalized structure, and considerable effort had been put into making this
structure work. To some, highly varying, degree it did. The main problem was that while
regionalcooperationinitselfwasmandatory,therewasnoauthorityabovethecountiesthat
was empowered to make binding decisions. But the framework was there to serve as the
foundation for a new state structure. Also important is the fact that the movement towards
regionalizationisageneral one.Though nonationaldecisiontoregionalizehasbeen made,
regionalization is increasing, incrementally and ad hoc, through decisions in a number of
important societalsectors.In afew years, customs, taxes, police, and road construction and
administration have been reorganized according to (different) regional principles.
54 The
trendcouldbeseenasareturntotheregionalplanningofthe1960sand1970s.Atthattime,
the region lost out to the county because it lacked democratic legitimacy.
55 Today, it is
reasonably clear that the process of regionalization contributes greatly towards breaking
down the county as the basic geographical unit of mid-level government organization.
There is good reason to believe that this strongly affects both the popular elected county
authorities and state functions at the county level.
The second process is one of de-democratization at the local, countyand regional levels.
In the early 1970s, placing financial responsibilities and the power of priority over impor-
tant welfare sectors in the hands of county political authorities, elected by popular vote,
was one of the strongest credos of its time. In the new regionalized hospital organization,
there is no element of mid-level democratic influence at all, at either county or regional
level. The region has no common governing institutions, only state sector bureaucracies.
The government, in its proposition to Parliament, stated that no practising politician ought
to sit on any board of any of the new hospital enterprises, and this principle was followed
when the boards were later appointed. A feeble, seemingly tactical suggestion, involving
somekind ofpolitically composed,regional advisory board,was defeated. This ‘‘keep-the-
county-politicians-out’’ axiom, was a clear reflection of the growing distrust of the role of
county politicians in hospital matters.
56 Hospitals and their professionals disliked county
politicians for interfering in professional affairs and for keeping the lid too tight on the
coffer. Central politicians tended to take the opposite view. Counties spent money at the
expense of the state, while at the same time they did not manage to direct and coordinate
hospitals so as to reduce costs and eliminate waiting lists. During the years of county rule,
the conflict over the role of politicians in hospital affairs was often played out precisely
54Harald Baldersheim, ‘Det regionpolitiske
regimet i omforming– retrett fra ˚ periferien;landsdelen
i sikte!’, Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, 2003, 3:
276–307; Harald Baldersheim and Larry E Rose,
‘Kampen om kommunen: Foran et nytt kommunalt
hamskifte’, Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift,
2003, 3: 231–9.
55Flo, op. cit., note 25 above, pp. 43–9.
56See parliamentary documents, note
52 above. The negative attitude towards
democratic input is central to recent British
hospital reform as well, see Mohan, op. cit.,
note 2 above, p. 220.
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Norwegian General Hospitals, 1970–2002: County Ownershipover the question of the composition of hospital boards; should politicians representing
county authorities be in a majority position on the boards? Should they be on the boards
at all?
57
The de-democratization of the county and local levels is—like regionalization—a gen-
eral trend. As already noted, the democratically elected county lost the trust of central
politicians and bureaucrats almost from the beginning, while state bureaucracies at county
level grew. There are clear parallels on the local level of self-government. Parliamentary
decisions with a high degree of detail, followed by financial schemes specifying precisely
howthemoneygrantedistobeused,havedramaticallyreducedleewayinlocaldemocratic
decision-making. This is aggravated by the strong tendency towards legislation and wel-
fare schemes that grant individual rights. Turning welfare benefits into legal rights makes
them the jurisdiction of the courts, rather than matters for democratically elected decision-
makers.
58 In the 2003 final report from the research programme ‘On Democracy and the
Distribution of Power in Norway’, it is argued that de-democratization of the local and
county levels is one of the country’s more serious political problems.
59 The public gen-
erally seems to be a lot more concerned about the level and quality of public service than
about democratic participation. It also seems reasonable to draw a parallel with the strong
tendency towards de-democratization represented by the transformation of state owned
public utilities and infrastructure into companies and autonomous state enterprises, thus
removing them from the hands of politicians.
The third tendency is closely linked to the second: the expansion of state functions at
the expense of local and regional organization (statliggjfring). It is worth remembering
that the state has always been a most active partner in Norwegian hospital organization
and direction, as determiner of national health policy, hospital investor, major
contributor towards running expenses, creator of the hierarchy of regional and county
hospital specialization, final guarantor of health quality control, and owner of the
Rikshospitalet with highly specialized functions. There is no doubt that the involvement
and influence of the state continued to grow throughout the county period of hospital
organization, at a time when leading state actors had no plans whatsoever for state
takeover.
Nevertheless,inalonghistoricalperspective,statetakeoverofhospitalscouldbeseenas
another, though especially important, element in the general development from welfare
localism to a real welfare state, with the emphasis on state. Welfare sectors, almost as a
rule, have a long tradition of localism in Norway, before they became supported, heavily
regulated and then gradually taken over by the state. Some of the more important sectors
may serve as examples: labour market organization, the police, the tax regime, and the
57After two years of mounting criticism about the
lack of democratic influence over the regional hospital
boards, the coalition government of the Labour Party,
the Agrarian Party and the Socialist Left, which came
to power after the 2005 elections, has promised to
reinstate county politicians on the boards.
58Baldersheim and Rose, op. cit., note 54 above,
pp. 231–9; Anne Lise Fimreite, Der hvor intet er,
har selv keiseren tapt sin rett! Om lokalt folkestyre
og rettigheter, Rokkansenteret Report 8, Bergen,
2003; Anne Lise Fimreite and Yngve Flo, ‘Den
besv rlige lokalpolitikken’, Nytt norsk tidsskrift,
2002, 3: 310–21.
59ØyvindØsterud,FredrikEngelstadandPerSelle,
Makten og demokratiet: en sluttbok fra Makt- og
demokratiutredningen, Makt- og
demokratiutredningen 1998–2003, Oslo, Gyldendal,
2003, pp. 9–151.
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Tore Grønliehighly varied system of peoples’ pensions schemes.
60 And, just to underline the current
expansion of the state, shortly after hospitals were taken over by the state, the same thing
happened to child welfare services and institutions for the treatment of alcoholics. Social
benefits are still part of the domain of local authorities, but a reform coordinating social
benefits, unemployment authorities, and the health insurance and pensions is now taking
effect under state leadership. From this perspective, the hospital sector is only one of many
in the latest wave of welfare provisions and institutions taken over by the state in the name
of equalizing welfare nationally.
The trend in recent decades towards ‘‘more state in the welfare state’’, however, now
seemstobecausedbyagreaterambitionfornationalwelfareequalitythaneverbefore.The
state’s desire to ease and level welfare differences between different regions and parts of
thecountry(utjevningsstaten—thelevellerstate)hasgraduallybeenreplacedbyaquestfor
total equality and individual welfare rights.
61 A lack of equality on local or county grounds
due to different priorities and varying ability to pay no longer seems to be acceptable.
Leading politicians at the national level are continually confronted by media-raised pres-
sures, often grounded in national statistics documenting geographically or socially based
inequalities. Proclamations concerning ‘‘unacceptable differences’’ caused by local or
county authorities create pressure for more state involvement. At a time when in many
countries decentralization is gaining strength as a strategy for keeping public costs down,
this has not, so far, been the case in Norway. The revenues from North Sea oil have made it
possible to continue development of costly welfare services, and an increasingly ambitious
equalization policy, with state authorities in the lead.
The fourth trend—and the only one directly connected to the organizational form
chosen—is towards organizing public functions in institutions that are autonomous or
semi-autonomous in relation to political or administrative public authorities. This is, of
course,ahighlyinternationaltrend,linkedtothebreakthroughofNewLiberalismandNew
Public Management in the 1980s. This reform thrust prescribes a thorough modernization
of the public sector, privatization, and a wide range of principles of management, com-
petition and organizational models from the private sector. The more radical contents of
New Public Management, especially privatization, never gained a strong foothold in
Norway, and in the 1980s and 1990s the country was generally a hesitant reformer
compared with the front-runners in New Public Management, such as, for example,
New Zealand.
62 Typically, a report from the early 1990s by a committee headed by
the junior minister of the Ministry of Social Affairs suggesting a trial organization of
hospitals as limited liability companies received little support, and seems to have been put
aside immediately. The solution obviously had too much of a private flavour to it.
60Grønlie, ‘Velferdskommunen, op. cit., note 7
above, pp. 43–52; Hovland, op. cit., note 7 above, pp.
127–43.
61Fimreite, op. cit., note 58 above; Fimreite and
Flo, op. cit., note 58 above.
62Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert, Public
management reform: a comparative analysis, Oxford
University Press, 2000; Tom Christensen and Per
L greid (eds), New public management: the
transformation of ideas and practice, Aldershot and
Burlington, VT, Ashgate, 2001; Bengt Jacobsson,
Per L greid and Ove K Pedersen, ‘Robust and
flexible states: the transnationalisation of Nordic
central administration’, Zeitschrift f€ u ur Staats- und
Europawissenschaften, 2004, 1: 1–24; Tom
Christensen and Per L greid, ‘New Public
Management i norsk statsforvaltning’, in Tranøy and
Østerud (eds), op. cit., note 1 above, pp. 67–95.
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Norwegian General Hospitals, 1970–2002: County OwnershipNevertheless, the tendency to organize public functions in autonomous or semi-
autonomous positions relative to political or administrative authorities was strong in
Norway and, in fact, had five decades of forerunners, especially in the field of industrial
policy and development. These experiences, as it turned out, were not irrelevant for the
hospital field. Two developments of the 1990s seem to have had, over time, a strong
bearing on the choice of a new model for the organization and direction of hospitals. The
first, from the early and mid-1990s, was a powerful stratagem to move public service
functions away from organizational forms within or near public administration and to give
them greater independence. This was in line with international developments, in this
Norway was greatly inspired by the EU. The telephone and postal services, power produc-
tion and supply, and the railways were among those affected. The second development,
however,wasmoreofaNorwegianinvention,ageneraltendencytosearchforcompromise
organizational forms, such as moving public functions out of the direct line of command
from politicians and public administrations, with the minister of the relevant sector still
retaining statutory rights to give (formal) political instructions. In a Scandinavian com-
parative perspective, we might be witnessing the emergence of a Norwegian model for
organizing public utilities, infrastructures and services.
63
The model originated after the establishment of the national oil company, Statoil, in the
1970s. The company was organized as a limited liability company, but its statutes included
a paragraph requiring the Minister of Oil and Energy to be consulted before decisions of
prime societal importance were taken. The telephone company, renamed Telenor, was
organized in accordance with the same model in 1994. During the 1990s, the Norwegian
authorities, in general, showed considerable creativity, constructing several middle-of-the-
road solutions for a number of public functions, organizing them as enterprises (foretak)
independent of bureaucracy, while retaining some political control. Statutory provisions of
the Statoil/Telenor type flourished.
64 There iseveryreason tobelieve that the legislationof
2002, organizing Norwegian hospitals as state regional enterprises, was strongly inspired
by this development. Central players in the process had earlier been involved in trans-
formations in the industrial and public utilities field. The newly appointed Minister of
Health,ToreTønne,whopersonallypromotedthereform,hadexperienceastheheadofthe
Agency for Industrial and District Development, which had a similar organizational form,
and in private business as well. The main difference between the statutory provisions that
politically empowered the Minister in the cases of the regional health enterprises and
Statoil/Telenor was their degree of detail: the key section of the statutes of the Regional
Health Enterprises gives a detailed list of important decisions that are to be referred to the
Minister, as the ultimate authority of the enterprise assembly.
65 In addition to this, it was
explicitly stated that state grants for the regional enterprises could be made dependent on
63Grønlie, ‘Mellom politikk og marked’, op. cit.,
note1above,pp.301–32;ØyvindNGrøndahlandTore
Grønlie, ‘From the Swedish ideal to EU direction:
Scandinavian central state administrative reform in the
1980sand1990s,inapost-1945perspective’,Jahrbuch
f€ u ur Europ€ a aische Verwaltungsgeschichte, 2004, 16:
151–96.
64Grønlie, ‘Mellom politikk og marked’, op. cit.,
note 1 above, pp. 319–22.
65Lov om helseforetak mm. (Law on
health enterprises and more), x30; Vedtekter
(statutes), x9.
206
Tore Grønlieconditions set by the Minister and his Department of Health without a formal decision by
the enterprise assembly.
The main point here is that in the course of the 1990s a realistic state organizational
alternativetothereigningcountyownershipgraduallyappearedfortheveryfirsttime.This
didnotmean,ofcourse,animmediateandcollectiveadoptionofthissolution.Mostreports
and statements throughout the 1990s argued for carrying on county ownership while, at the
same time, giving hospitals greater independence within this organizational form. A
provision in the new law on local self-government of 1992 for creating municipal and
county enterprises probably catered to this need. The years approaching the millennium,
however, turned out to be somewhat of a melting pot for organizational ideas, resulting in
several radical reforms and developments. This leads finally to ideology and political
leadership.
There was an ideological shift in Norway, as in many parts of the western world, in the
early and mid-1980s. There was obviously a move towards liberalism, a strengthening of
the new right, a thrust towards the reform of the public sector and bureaucracy, and a turn
towards the market, competition and management. This change primarily affected the
parties of the right, but can also be traced in Social Democracy, heavily burdened by the
realization of the breakdown of comprehensive planning and the Keynesian counter-
cyclical policies of the late 1970s. This change triggered comprehensive debates on
reorganization, including that of the hospital sector. In general, however, changes during
the 1980s consisted more of rhetoric and the politics of symbolism than of substantial
reforms.
66 The hospital sector was even more resistant than most.
InNorway,thesecondideologicalshift,fromthemid-1990s,wasfarmoresubstantial,and
thistimeitcutdeepintoSocialDemocracyaswell.Whilethe1980swerestillcharacterized
bythoughtsof‘‘planning’’and‘‘direction’’,‘‘market’’and‘‘competition’’weretheorderof
the day in the 1990s. This is clearly seen in industrial policy, the general process of auton-
omizationanddevolution,privatizationandthestockexchangelistingofmajorstate-owned
companies.Itisreflectedinadecreasingsupportfordecisionsthroughdemocraticprocesses
and increasing support for independent and authoritative processes of professional leader-
ship. Public administration and bureaucracy were scrutinized in an intensified hunt for
unnecessary functions, dual administrations and work done twice or more. In this process,
countyauthoritieswereviewedmorenegativelythanothertiersofgovernment.DidNorway
really need both self-governing authorities and state functions at the county level? Did
Norway need a level of government between the local authorities and the state at all?
The trust in county authorities elected by popular vote fell, probably to an all-time low.
Concluding Remarks
The ideological change among the leaders of the Labour Party, therefore, became the
decisive factor behind the transformation of hospital organization. This change made
possiblethecreationofawinningcoalitionofstateenterprise.Itappearsthatacompromise
was found, transforming the field of hospital organization and direction, which
66Grøndahl and Grønlie, op. cit., note 63 above,
pp. 168–83.
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Norwegian General Hospitals, 1970–2002: County Ownershipcommanded a hefty 50 to 75 per cent of the county authority budgets, while at the same
time allowing the self-governing county authorities to limp on—for the time being.
The main argumentofthis paper,however,has been, that county authorityownership, in
a long-term perspective, could be seen as an uneasy interlude in a century-long quest for a
way to solve the permanent tensions and conflicts in Norwegian hospital organization, the
most important being the contention between localism and state direction. County author-
ity organization was the preferred structure in the early 1970s, in hospital direction as in
government reform in general, but, as it turned out, this soon lost popularity. The interlude
lasted thirty years, at least partly because no good alternative was found. It ended because
the quest for national equalization by the state became steadily more compelling, and
because a realistic alternative was finally found, which this time also coincided with the
dominant organizing principles of the day. County organization, a strong belief in local-
and mid-level democratic processes and anti-bureaucratic sentiment ruled the land in the
early 1970s. The hegemonic government reform paradigm of today relies heavily on
regional reorganization, semi-autonomous enterprises under professional or bureaucratic
leadership and central state direction of welfare. How to organize seems more important
than what to organize.
From a historical perspective there was, at the time of reorganization, little reason to
believe that state takeover would remove a century of conflicts and tensions in hospital
direction overnight. The state inherited in 2002 much the same problems as the county
authorities had some thirty years earlier, and, as was to be expected, problems traditionally
inherent in the semi-independent state enterprise model would also be taken on.
67 Four
years have passed since state takeover, and it is far too early to evaluate historically the
merits of the new system. It is, however, no big surprise, that during those four years, the
regional enterprise system has been plagued by a host of problems. Nor is it surprising that
among the most important of these problems are localism versus county-ism and region-
alism, serious conflicts between regional enterprises and the state over financial obliga-
tions and bigger-than-ever deficits, conflicts over enterprise and local hospital autonomy,
the role and functions of the Minister of Health and his bureaucracy in enterprise decision-
making, and the problems in defining the role of politicians. This time, however, these are
not county-level politicians, but the Minister and Members of Parliament—in far-away
Oslo.
68
67See Grønlie, ‘Mellom politikk og marked’, op.
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conclusions from the ongoing social science research
on the four years of putting the reform into effect. The
reform, hailed by proponents as an instrument of
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